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Judge Frank M. Coffin, of the United States Court of
Appeals, First Circuit, has put into a single sentence of his
opinion in BRUNO STILLMAN, INC. v THE GLOBE NEWSPAPERS (1980),
the essence of the Robert Hohler case.
He said:
"In determining what if any limits should
placed upon the granting of such requests (for discovery

be
of

testimony) courts must balance the potential harm to the free
flow of information that might result against the asserted
need for the required information."
That is what this case is about.
The courts have been
struggling with this problem since 1958 when GARLAND v TORRE,
raised the issue, and they have increasingly acknowledged the
existence of a testimonial privilege residing in the press.
Torre went against the press, but acknowledged that there could
be situations where the privilege existed.
BRANZBURG v HAYES, U. S. Supreme Court, 1972, enlarged
upon the principle or privilege, and although it went against
the press, Justice Lewis Powell’s concurring opinion set forth
the need to balance demonstrated need for disclosure against
the requirements of a free press.
Justice Potter Stewart in
a dissent in which Brennan and Marshall joined, held that
journalists should not be required to reveal confidential
information to a grand jury unless the government could show
there was probable cause to believe the newsman had information
clearly relevant
and demonstrated

to the specific probable violation of law,
that the information sought could not be

obtained
by alternative
means
less destructive
of First
Amendment rights, and demonstrate a compelling and over-riding
interest

in

the

information.

(Testimonial

Privileges,

Page

418)
Interest in this balance grew over the years as law
enforcement officials began to use more frequently the power
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to subpoena reporters and editors to testify in criminal and
civil cases.
From
1970 to 1975 there were
500 subpoenas.
They have been almost too numerous to count since:
the
Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press from 1986 to
September
1987 has had 1,500 calls for legal advice on the
subject.
Maine, according to David Cheever, of the Maine
Attorney General's office, has had three journalist subpoenas
in the last two years and five requests for reporter testimony,
but he acknowledges his information is imcomplete.
Other events in this effort to unfold a rule have included
many cases in the circuit courts, such as:
STATE v ST. PETER, in 1974, a Vermont case in which infor
mation sought from a journalist was held not related to guilt
or innocence.
RILEY v CITY OF CHESTER, in the Third Circuit Court in
1979, in which the court refused to enforce disclosure because
the journalistic source was only marginally related and the
court refused to enforce disclosure.
BRUNO STILLMAN, INC. v THE GLOBE NEWSPAPERS, 1980, in
the First Circuit, where testimony was not required because
of the impact on the journalistic newsgathering ability had
not been sufficiently weighed in the district court.
In a
footnote, Judge Coffin cited the late Alexander Bickel, who
said: "The issue is the public’s right to know.
That right
is the reporters by virtue of the proxy which the freedom of
the press clause of the First Amendment gives to the press
in behalf of the public."
Another footnote called attention
to Branzberg’s stating that "without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."
This, said Coffin, points to the kind of Constitutionally
sensitized
Branzberg.

and
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process
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The Department of Justice, long ago recognized the problem
14 years ago in1973 issued
a guideline regulating the

A.
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government’s power to issue subpoenas to the media.
As
summarized in the Practicing Law Institute’s Communications
Handbook, the guidelines ’’gave reporters a qualified privilege
against government subpoenas.
Members of the media could not
be subpoenaed if the desired information was obtainable through
alternative sources or investigative steps.
They could be
subpoenaed only in criminal cases, and then only if the govern
ment had reason to believe the information sought was essential
to the investigation
of a crime that had occurred.
Subpoenas
were to
be limited
to matters concerning the accuracy
of
published information except under exigent circumstances
were not to involve volumes of unpublished materials.”

and

The modern version of these guidelines appears in the
1980 rules of Judicial Administration, Title 28, section 50.10.
They set forth the widely known three-fold rule of: relevance
to the case, availability of alternative sources, and the degree
to which the sought information is essential to the conduct
of the case.
The guidelines also provide that no subpoena
may be issued to the media without the express authorization
of the Attorney General.
In a preamble to the detailed guides, the Department of
Justice
saysthat ”in determining whether
to request
the
issuance of a subpoena to a member of the news media.... the
approach in every case must be to strike the proper balance
between
the public’s
interest in the freedissemination
of
ideas and information and the public’s interest in effective
law enforcement.”
The Law Institute’s Communications Law of 1986, Vol. II,
notes the litigation since the issue of the
guidelines.
In
the Federal
Circuitcourts, newspaper privilege to withhold
has been recognized in the D.C. Circuit, the First Circuit,
the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit,
the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, and
the Eleventh Circuit.
It has been recognized at the district
level in the Sixth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit.
District
Courts are in conflict in the Ninth Circuit.
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The work of Stone and Liebmann, in the Trial Practise
Series, published by McGraw Hill, notes that "the journalists
First Amendment privilege has gained such widespread acceptance
that its applicability in most situations
to question.
There is now a sufficiently
dealing with
defined."

the

privilege

is no longer open
large body of law

that its contents

are fairly well

One notable Circuit Court opinion is that of the District
of Columbia circuit court holding that "compelled disclosure
by a journalist must be fa last resort after pursuit of other
opportunities has failed1." (Page 442, Stone and Liebmann.)
In the only reported federal case where the prosecution
sought to compel a journalist to confirm that a defendant had
made statements attributed to him in the journalist’s article,
disclosure was denied.
S and L 443. U.S. v BLANTON 534 Fed
Supp 295 (SD Fla 1982).
In this case S and L say: "A reporter
was subpoenaed
to appear at trial for the sole purpose of
verifying that the defendant had made the statements attributed
to him in a published article.
The district court held that
even this limited imposition would have a chilling effect on
press operations and quashed the subpoena for failure to
exhaust non-media avenues for obtaining the same or equivalent
information."
Stone/Liebmann after an exhaustive study of cases, con
cludes that "In recent years, courts have broadened their
conception of
the press interests threatened by
compelled
disclosure.
Forced production of any unpublished material
or information
is now widely seen to constitute a serious
intrusion on the press’s functional autonomy in newsgathering
and editing, an autonomy deemed vital to the press’s effective
fulfillment of its societal role."
They also acknowledge that "journalists are generally
considered to have no significant interest, or a substantionally

A
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diminished interest, in the protection of information and
materials in the following circumstances:
(1) when they have
previously published or broadcast the information, (2) when
the information involves criminal events to which they were
eye witnesses, and (3) when the information was not obtained
in a newsgathering or editorial role.”
Hohler’s information was published, but as I understand
the situation he faced a threat that he would be asked questions
beyond the published material in cross examination, and there
was no enumeration of or specification limiting the issues
to published matter in the order to appear and testify.
It
that I

is against this background on the state of the law
think we must examine the
Hohler case.
From the

testimony of Assistant Attorney General Thomas Goodwin I gather
that: (1) He obtained the indictment of Richard Steeves without
Hohlerfs story; (2) He was confident that he had a prosecutable
case without ever knowing of it;
(3) he commenced the trial
of the case without having issued a subpoena to get Hohler
to testify.
His conduct did not conform to the rules of the
U. S. Department of Justice or the policy prevailing in the
circuit courts generally, in that:(1) he had alternative
sources for the same informationin
own investigator;
(2) he did not

a statement given to his
seek other sources;
(3)

he did not feel Hohler’s testimony essential to convict
in fact it proved unnecessary in the trial of the case.)
Given the state of the
in my opinion, the subpoena

(and

law and the facts in this case,
should not have been issued, no

contempt charge should have been made, there should have been
no prosecution of Hohler for contempt of court, and he should
not have been tried and convicted.
I think the Maine Attorney
General ought to have guidelineslike those laid down by
the
Attorney General of the United States.
I think the conduct
of

the Attorney

General's

office,

in its reckless efforts

to
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use the press, is a threat to freedom of the press; a violation
of
the Constitution of the United States
as it is generally
construed in the federal courts at this time (even though an
affirmative case has not reached the U. S. Supreme Court.)
Robert Hohler was tried

and convicted for an act inspired

by
his professional belief in the right
of the press to a
testimonial withholding privilege consistent with the prepon
derant views of the federal courts, many state courts, and
the U. S. Department of Justice.
He is, in my opinion, the
victim of an outrageous miscarriage of justice.

James Russell Wiggins

